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welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in any dispute
over custody. The parents also should receive consideration, but the
ultimate thoughts should be of the child's well being. This demands
that judges and courts recognize that a child should not be the subject
of inconsistent commands, for consistency of command is a basic pre-
cept in rearing children. When everyone is allowed to decide a ques-
tion, it is decided by no one.
PAUL H. COFFEY, JR.
ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
Arbitration is the submission for determination of disputed matters
to unofficial persons who are selected in a manner provided by agree-
ment or law.1 The origin of arbitration is obscure but supposedly
commercial arbitration had its beginning with the practices of the
market and fair courts, and in the merchant gilds. 2 Some form of ar-
bitration statute is in force in almost every state.3
The majority rule in this country is that agreements to submit
existing disputes to arbitration, i.e., submission agreements, are bind-
ing and enforceable, but agreements to submit future controversies,
i.e., future agreements, are not binding on the parties.4 This rule
easily made when a court is so inclined, and plausible grounds therefore can quite
generally be found, it follows that the recognition extraterritorially which custody
orders will receive or can command is liable to more theoretical than of great prac-
tical consequence." Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 478, 77 Ad. 1, 6 (191o).
1Stockwell v. Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 134 Cal. App. 534, 25 P.2d 873,
875-76 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
2 Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 132 (1934).
aSee notes 4 and 9 infra.
"The present majority rule in the United States regarding abitration is that
only submission agreements are binding. Ala. Code tit. 7, § 829 (Recomp. 196o); Ark.
Stat. § 34-502 (1947); Del. Code Ann. tit. o, §§ 5701-06 (1953); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 57.01
(1957); Ga. Code Ann. § 7-101 (1935); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 7-901-10 (1957); Ill.
Ann. Stat. Ch. to, § i (1941); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-201 (Repl. Vol. 1946); Iowa Code
Ann. § 679a (1958); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 5-201 (1949); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 417.010
(1955); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Ch. 121, § 1 (1954); Md. Ann. Code art. 7, § (1957);
Minn. Stat. §§ 572.o8-.30 (1953); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 279 et seq. (1942); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 435.010, 435.020 (1949); Montana: no citation available; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2103-
20 (1943); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-1 (1953); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-544 (Recomp. 1953);
N.D. Rev. Code §§ 32-2901-12 (1943); S.C. Code § 0-io90i (1952); Tenn. Code Ann. §§
23-501-19 (1956); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 224 (1948); Utah has the Uniform Act, see
note 12 infra; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§ 501-13 (1959) (agreements to arbitrate future
labor disputes are enforceable); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8-503-06 (Repl. Vol. 1950); West
Virginia, see note 8 infra; Wyoming Comp. Stat. § 3-5601-24 (1945)-
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has been adopted by statute or decision in twenty-nine states and
modifies the old common-law rule that all agreements to arbitrate,
even existing disputes, are revocable at the will of either party.5
Two states deviated from the common-law rule at an early date by
judicial decision. Pennsylvania allowed future agreements to be bind-
ing as early as 1842.6 It was held that future agreements were enforce-
able if the stipulation to arbitrate the controversy designated the ar-
bitrators or the tribunal whose decision should govern. This Penn-
sylvania rule has now been liberalized by statute, and these require-
ments are no longer necessary to enforce such future agreements.7
Virginia deviated from the common-law rule, holding that although
future agreements were unenforceable, arbitration of a future dispute
would be enforced as a condition precedent to any law suit by a party
to the contract.8 However, those states following either the old com-
mon-law rule or the present majority rule generally will not enforce
future agreements.
By statute, eighteen states and the District of Columbia have abro-
rThe common-law rule originally allowed both parties to revoke such a contract
at will. It supposedly originated from dictum by Lord Coke. Vynior's Case, 8 Co.
Rep. 8ib, 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 598-6o0 (K.B. 16o9). See Dolman v. Board of Commis-
sioners, 1i6 Kan. 201, 226 Pac. 240, 243 (1924); Goerke Kirch Co. v. Goerke Kirch
Holding Co., 18 N.J. Eq. 1, 176 Atl. 902, 904 (1935); Wolaver, The Historical Back-
ground of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 132, 138 (1934); 6 C.J.S.
Arbitration & Award § 33(a) (1937).
However, nominal damages may be awarded to the non-breaching party. Elec-
trical Research Products, Inc. v. Vitaphone Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 417, 171 Atl. 738
748 (1934). Blaisdell v. Blaisdell, 14 N.H. 78, 81 (1843). See 6 Williston, Contracts §
1927 (rev. ed. 1938).
6 Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Fenlon, 4 W. & S. 205 (Pa. 1842). See Howard v. Al-
legheny Valley R.R., 69 Pa. 489 (1871); Lauman v. Young, 31 Pa. 3o6 (1858).
7Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 161 (1930).
8 Condon v. South Side R.R. 54 Va. (14 Gratt.) 302 (1858). The court stated
that "parties, by their contract may lawfully make the decision of arbitrators or of
any third person a condition precedent to a right of action upon the contract. In that
case such decision is a part of the cause of action. Until the decision ... becomes
complete, the courts have no jurisdiction of the case, and therefore cannot be said to
be ousted of their jurisdiction by the contract." Id. at 314.
. But for the exception stated in the preceding case, Virginia by statute adopts
the rule that submission agreements are binding, but future agreements to arbi-
trate are not binding.
Va. Code Ann. § 8-503 (1950) provides: "Persons desiring to end any contro-
versy, whether there be a suit pending therefor or not, may submit the same to
arbitration, and agree that such submission may be entered of record in any court."
The Code further provides that "No such submission, entered or agreed to be entered
of record in any court, shall be revocable by any party to such submission, without
the leave of such court...." Va. Code Ann. § 8-504 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
A contract to submit future differences to arbitration is not binding in West
Virginia. Hughes v. National Fuel Co., 121 W. Va. 392, 3 S.E.gd 621, 624 (1939).
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gated the common-law rules.9 New York, in 192o, adopted an arbitra-
tion act which expressly provides that both submission agreements
and future agreements to arbitrate are enforceable. 10 The American
Arbitration Association shortly thereafter proposed a draft act modeled
upon the New York Act which enforces both types of agreements.
This act or one similar thereto has been adopted in seventeen states"
and appears to represent the modern trend in statutory control of
arbitration.
Four states have passed the Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated
in 1924 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.' 2 The Uniform
Act codifies the common-law majority rule, but it does not expressly
void or invalidate future agreements 13 even though such agreements
were looked upon with disfavor at the time of its passage.' 4 This act
was withdrawn in 1943 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The Supreme Court of Nevada, a state which has passed the Uni-
form Act,15 recently declared in United Ass'n of Journeymen & App.
of Plumbing v. Stine 6 that a provision in a labor agreement requiring
9The following statutes provide for enforcement of both types of arbitration
agreements: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-1509 - II (1956); Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1280 - 93
(Deering 1959); Colo. Rev. Civ. Proc. § 1o9 a - g; Conn. Gen Stat. Rev. § 52-408
(1958); District of Columbia: 9 US.C. §§ I - 14 (1958); Hawaii Rev. Laws §§
188-1 - 15 (955); La. Rev. Stat. § 9:4201 (195o) (in commercial arbitration); Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 251, § 14 (1956); Mich. Comp. Laws § 645.1 (1948); Nevada: As shown
in this comment; N.H. Rev. Laws ch. 415 § 1 (1952); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:2 4 -1 (1952);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1448 (Clevenger 196o); Ohio Rev. Code § 2711.01 (Baldwin
196o); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 33.220 (future agreements in labor disputes are unenforce-
able. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 33.210); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 5, § 161 (1930); R.f. Gen Laws Ann.
§ 47-1 (1938) (as to Labor Arbitration, see R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-9 (1938)); Wash.
Rev. Code § 7.04.010; Wis. Stat. § 298.01 ('959).
"0N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1448 (Clevenger ig6o). "Except as otherwise prescribed
in this section, two or more persons may submit to arbitration any controversy ex-
isting between them at the time of the submission ... or they may contract to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them and such submission
or contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable.
"See note 9 supra.
"The following four states have passed the Uniform Act, as shown by Uniform
Laws Annotated: Nevada in 1925, North Carolina in 1927, Utah in 1927, Wyoming in
1927.
"rhe Act provides that "two or more parties may agree in writing to submit
to arbitration, in conformity with the provisions of this act, any controversy
existing between them at the time of the agreement to submit. Such an agreement
shall be valid and enforceable, and neither party shall have the power to revoke
the submission without the consent of the other party . .. " Uniform Arbitration
Act § 1 (9 Unif. Laws Ann. 1942).
. "Gregory & Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17
U. Chi. L. Rev. 233, 239 (1950).
ONev. Rev. Stat. § 38.oo to § 38.240 (1960).
"351 P.2d 965 (Nev. ig6o).
CASE COMMENTS
the submission of a future controversy to arbitration is enforceable. In
the Stine case, an employer sought damages from the union for vio-
lation of a contract providing for arbitration of any material issues
before a strike could be called. The union violated this provision and
in so doing, assertedly ruined the employer's business. The Supreme
Court adopted the modern view enforcing future agreements although
it was noted that such agreements were unenforceable at common law;
that the majority of states will not enforce such agreements; 17 and that
Nevada has enacted no statute enforcing future agreements. The court,
admitting that the argument against the adoption of the modern
view was well supported by authority, stated:
"We are impelled by reason and logic, by fallacies inherent
in the common-law doctrine... itself and by reason of
the inapplicability of the common-law doctrine of unenforce-
ability of arbitration contracts in this state as particularly il-
lustrated by the appeal now before us, to adopt the minority
view."' 8
Since there is little direct authority to support the court's conclusion, 19
it must have been found that arbitration is a highly desirable method
of settling disputes and that there is no persuasive objection to the
enforcement of either submission agreements or agreements to arbitrate
in the future. The fact that no other state has adopted the rule so com-
pletely by decision may explain the lack of authority cited. However, it
is not unreasonable to assume that in light of this decision, courts in
other states which have the Uniform Act or a similar law may reach
a result comparable to Stine upon the courts' recognition of the merits
of arbitration. But this method of settling disputes will have to with-
stand close scrutiny before older common-law techniques will be
discarded.
Justification for arbitration is simple. It is more effective, less pro-
longed, and generally less expensive than other methods of handling
technical disputes and negotiations between unions and employers.2 0
"See notes 4 and 9 supra.
1"351 P.2d at 972.
"'Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist., 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475,
477-78 (1941); Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., io8 Utah 364, i6o P.2d 421, 423 (1945).
"Hughes v. National Fuel Co.. 121 W. Va. 392, 3 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1939). See
Taeusch, Extrajudicial Settlement of Controversies, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 147, 15io (1934)
where it is stated that, -to a business man especially, time is money; and the vexa-
tious delays in litigation, the interruptions to business caused by recurrent con-
%ultations and legal hearings ... are all inimical to the proper formulation of busi-
ness policies...." See also, Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial
Arbitration, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59o, 591 (1934).
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Trained men, with attorneys as advisors,21 can settle disputes with
greater understanding of technical issues than can a jury composed of
laymen. Rigid rules of evidence used by the courts can be, and often
are, limitedby arbitrators in order to understand the basic problems
involved.2 2 Certain technical defenses may be dispensed with by the
arbitration board in the interest of justice.23 Experience makes the
arbitrators better able to distinguish the pertinent facts from those
which are not pertinent 24-this reason alone perhaps justifies their
right to abandon the rigid rules of evidence.
The question then arises, should not all states enforce future
agreements to arbitrate as well as submission agreements? Each argu-
ment which is made in support of submission agreements can be made
with equal force in support of future agreements. Furthermore, if
parties at the outset desire to take advantage of this more expedient
method of settlement, one must be able to contract therefor, knowing
that if a dispute arises, the controversy will be settled by the method
agreed upon.25 This enhances the stability of contracts. It would ap-
pear quite undesirable that the non-defaulting party incur extra ex-
pense by having to go to court to enforce arbitration. Also the default-
ing party might win an unfair advantage, for he would not have to
arbitrateas contemplated, but could go to trial with hopes of winning
2N. Y. Civil Prac. Act § 1454 provides that no one in an arbitration suit shall
waive the right of counsel unless such waiver is evidenced in writing.
"-"Every year has seen more arbitrations than in the preceding year. This is
because arbitration is speedier, less costly, free from technical rules of evidence and
court room procedure, and the controversies [are] decided by business men experts,
rather than a jury of men who not only are unfamiliar with the intricacies of the
business involved, but who are incapable of comprehending them and who are
easily swayed in their decision by the eloquence or clever psychological by-plays
of lawyers. Arbitration is speedier; ordinarily an award may be rendered within
two weeks after the demand for arbitration has ben served, whereas, because of
the congested condition of the court calendars in most of the large cities through
the country, cases cannot be reached for trial until two or more years after the
pleadings are filed. Arbitration is less- expensive than trial of the controversy at law,
because there are no expert witnesses to be paid, no jury fees, no court costs, no
expensive stenographic record to be typed, no costly transcripts of record on
appeal, and because no appeal lies from the arbitrator's award." Whitney, Modern
Commercial Practices § 440 (1958).
2In re Exeter Mfg. Co., 254 App. Div. 496, 5 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1st Dep't 1938). See
also United Culinary Bar & Grill Employees v. Schiffman, 272 App. Div. 491, 71
N.YS.2d i6o (ist Dep't 1947), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 577, 86 N.E.zd io4 (1949); Phillips,
Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59o,
616 (1934).
"See note 22 supra.
'For a case discussing the instability of this type of contract, see McCullough v.
Clinch-Mitchell Constr. Co., 71 F.2d 17, 20 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S.
582 (1934)-
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on some technicality. Additional reasons for permitting future agree-
ments to be binding are summed up in the following quotation:
"The pai ties were of full age. They weighed the benefits and
obligations of the contract they were about to make, and the
benefits tipped the scales. After breach, one party claims the
right to repudiate his pact. To support this right he calls upon
a rule founded on a misunderstanding of the principles of
law, strengthened by a jealousy of jurisdiction now discoun-
tenanced, continued only by respect for authority. The experi-
ence of centuries of commercial arbitration casts doubt upon
his sincerity-it is the defaulting party who breaks his promise
to arbitrate, the party who has most to gain by delay and tech-
nicality. The common knowledge of mankind bears out these
facts."2 16
The factors weighing against arbitration are few and relatively
insignificant. Two general criticisms against arbitration are that con-
tracts to arbitrate oust the courts of jurisdiction, and therefore are
against public policy;2 7 and that, where future agreements are made
enforceable, the stronger party at the time of making the contract
will be able to enforce his will upon the weaker party.28 For years,
however, courts and writers have refuted such reasons for disallowing
arbitration. 29 In addition, this form of adjudication would alleviate
the current problem of crowded court dockets.
In conclusion, it is noted that the Stine case, although reaching a
commendable result, leaves the arbitration'law in Nevada rather con-
fused. The Uniform Act adopted by Nevada provides only for en-
forcement of submission agreements and has not been repealed,
'Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31
Yale L.J. 147, 158 (1921).
7"In most jurisdictions wherein the subject has been judicially considered, the
rule recognized is that, in the absence of statute to the contrary, a provision whereby
parties to a contract stipulate to submit to arbitration... future disputes which
may arise thereunder is invalid, or at least 'unenforceable'." Annot., 135 A.L.R.
79. 8o (1941). The author of the annotation then cites numerous cases from various
jurisdictions which have held that such stipulations are invalid as depriving the
courts of jurisdiction.
'Parsons v. Ambos, 121 Ga. 98, 48 S.E. 696, 697 (19o4). See 53 A.B.A. Rep. 337,
352 (1928).
z'Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Arntorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir.
i9 2); United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Pretroleum Co., 222 Fed.
ioo6, iooS (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (dictum); Scott v. Avery, 5 H.L. 811, 1O Eng. Rep.
1121 (1855); Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration
Agreements, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 233, 235-37 (195o); Annot., 135 A.L.R. 79, 91 (1940.
It should be noted that the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws withdrew the
Uniform Arbitration Act in August of 1943. See Handbook of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 73 (1943).
